

*Rethinking  
National Security*



*February 28, 2002*



An address by  
Chancellor Albert Carnesale



Albert Carnesale became Chancellor of UCLA on July 1, 1997, and is the eighth chief executive in the University's history. He holds faculty appointments in the School of Public Policy and Social Research and in the Henry Samueli School of Engineering and Applied Science.

Before assuming the helm of UCLA, Dr. Carnesale was at Harvard University for 23 years, as a professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and in the posts of Academic Dean (1981–1991) and Dean (1991–1995) of the School. He became Provost of Harvard in 1994.

Chancellor Carnesale was a member of the faculty at North Carolina State University from 1962 to 1969, and again from 1972 to 1974. In the intervening years, he served on the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) with the Soviet Union. In addition, he worked in private industry for Martin Marietta Corporation from 1957 to 1962.

An expert on foreign and defense policy matters, Dr. Carnesale has consulted regularly for several U.S. government agencies, and has led or participated in numerous high-level U.S. delegations. He also has co-authored six books, and has authored or co-authored more than 50 articles.

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UCLA  
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The thoughts that I am going to outline today were drawn, in part, from the seminars on national security that I have been teaching here at UCLA over the past two quarters. The students, primarily freshmen and sophomores, always ask: “Why does it have to be that way?” This does force you to think about these subjects more critically, and to challenge your assumptions.

I would like to begin, as one begins analyzing almost any policy question, with a bit of history. A historical perspective helps to provide context, and will also help to frame the issues that we are going to address today.

Consider first a central tradition of United States foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy has always focused on one or two foreign powers that were perceived as our principal adversaries. From the Revolutionary War to close to the end of the nineteenth century, it was Great Britain that was viewed as the primary threat. In the first half of the twentieth century, Germany was seen as the principal threat in Europe, in South America, and the Atlantic, and Japan as the principal threat in Asia and the Pacific. And, of course, both Germany and Japan were engaged in World Wars I and II. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union was perceived to be the primary threat, indeed as a global threat, and the People’s Republic of China as a secondary adversary. That period, as we all know, is known as the Cold War Era.

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With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire, we lost our principal adversary. There was no organizing principal for American foreign policy, as is evident from the fact that we call that period the “post-Cold War Era.” We didn’t define it by what it *was*; we defined it by what it was *not*, because we hadn’t quite figured out what the post-Cold War Era was.

Through the final decade of the twentieth century, the United States was searching for its role in the world. As many of you can remember, we were engaged in Somalia, in Haiti, in Iraq and Kuwait, in the Taiwan Strait, in Bosnia, and in Kosovo. What was the principle upon which we chose to engage in those places, as opposed to others? I don’t know of anyone who knows what that principle was. There was no organizing principle for U.S. engagement in the world. And so, by the end of the 1990s, we all recognized that there was a need to refocus, and perhaps even to redefine, our national interests.

In a lecture I gave at UCLA a couple of years ago, I gave my characterization of America’s national interests. It was perhaps a bit cute, but I think it captured the essence of what I wanted to say. I said that there were three sets of interests, in this order of priority: survival, security, and satisfaction. Survival refers to protecting our lives, and our way of life, against direct threats to our homeland. Security refers to avoiding and dampening conflicts that have the potential to escalate and to become threats to our survival. And satisfaction refers to extending our values and our way of life to others who choose to share them.

What are the threats to our interests, and how might we counter them? With regard to survival, the principal threat, by far, is that posed by weapons of mass destruction — nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and chemical weapons. We place particular emphasis on the Russian and Chinese arsenals because they are the largest, but we must also be concerned with weapons

of mass destruction in the hands of other nations, and in the hands of terrorist organizations.

Security — that is, the avoidance of conflicts that might escalate — requires that we prevent the rise of a hostile major power, a hegemon, in either Europe or Asia. Security also requires that we preserve the viability of global systems that are essential to our way of life, such as financial markets, trade, the environment, and availability of energy resources. Maintaining energy resources, in turn, requires access to Persian Gulf oil.

In terms of satisfaction, it is important that we honor our international commitments, such as those we have made to fellow members of NATO, to South Korea, and to Taiwan, and that we extend, whenever possible, democracy and human rights.

What has changed since September 11 that might affect our interests? First, we now all recognize that the United States is vulnerable to threats to our homeland, and that we are not very well-prepared to deal with them. The events of September 11 and the anthrax episode have also made us very much aware that our way of life can be seriously degraded by means other than weapons of mass destruction; that is, by what we now call weapons of mass *disruption*.

We recognize, perhaps more than ever before, that the United States is not universally admired, to put it mildly. There are religious differences — many people in the world consider the U.S. to be an “amoral” society that willingly exports that amorality. There are those who are very much opposed to globalization and believe that it simply increases the gap between the rich and the poor. Some object to our close relationship with Israel and/or with our sanctions toward Iraq. We have learned that many disagree strongly with us and with our actions.

We have come to recognize the increased importance of non-state actors — groups and organizations that are not countries

— because they have increased access to high technology communications and advanced weapons, things that in the past were available only to nations. Groups such as Al Qaeda now have global organizations and global reach.

We have come to recognize that even the “all-powerful” United States cannot achieve its goals independently. We need coalitions to deal with a number of the problems that we face. We need a coalition to deal with terrorism. We need other countries for the intelligence information that they can provide. We need other countries for military logistics. We don’t need other countries for military *power*. We can handle just about anybody by ourselves, if all that is required is military might. But cooperation with others is needed for access to airstrips in other parts of the world, or for flights over other countries’ territory.

And we need cooperation if we are going to freeze the assets of terrorists. The financial system is, of course, an international financial system. We also need cooperation from other countries if we are going to ensure that this conflict is not perceived as a “War against Islam.” We must have cooperation so that this war is not viewed as simply another unilateral act on the part of the United States.

We need to collaborate with others because there are some problems that simply cannot be solved by one nation, problems that are much like terrorism. Maintaining the financial markets cannot be done by one country. International trade, by definition, cannot be supported by one country. The environment cannot be maintained by one country. Public health, control of drugs, access to energy, all of these, by their very nature, require collaboration with others.

In order to address the threats to our survival, we must know something about weapons of mass destruction, and weapons of mass disruption. Chemical weapons, biological weapons, and nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction.

Chemical weapons are lethal, man-made poisons. They have been around for a long time. There are choking agents, like chlorine; blood gases, like hydrogen cyanide, which block the transport of oxygen in blood; vesicants, such as mustard gas, which burn the skin, eyes, and lungs, and were used in World War I and elsewhere; and nerve agents, like sarin, which disable the nervous system. Sarin was the chemical agent that was used in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo group, the cult in Japan that distributed it in the Tokyo subway system. While they unsuccessfully attempted to distribute sarin several times, one attempt did result in the death of twelve people.

Of the weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons are the easiest to produce. If you have a fertilizer plant, you can produce chemical agents. Hazardous chemical agents are stored in about 850,000 facilities in the United States. If you have a swimming pool, there’s chlorine in it, and that chlorine had to come from somewhere. Chemical weapons are the least likely to produce widespread death or illness, because it is difficult to deliver them in high concentrations over a large area, or to many people.

There is an international agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention, that is intended to curb chemical weapons. It bans the possession and the use of such weapons. It contains some verification provisions, but few have high confidence in them. About three-fourths of the countries in the world, 145 countries, have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. Six of the countries that have refused to join are suspected of having chemical weapons arsenals. They are Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. There may be more.

Biological weapons are somewhat different. They are pathogenic microorganisms or biologically-produced toxins that cause illness or death. They can be viruses, bacteria, or rickettsiae (which have some of the characteristics of viruses,

and some of bacteria), or fungi, or toxins. They are more difficult to produce than chemical weapons, but less difficult to produce than nuclear weapons.

Military organizations do not like biological weapons. They are difficult to use and difficult to control. Biological weapons generally require aerosol distribution in order to be able to infect thousands of people. It is hard to achieve the necessary concentrations, and difficult to avoid infecting your own people, especially nowadays, given the global transportation networks. If there is a smallpox epidemic in the United States, and some infected people travel to other countries, they will start smallpox epidemics there. Unless you are willing to take the risk of having a smallpox epidemic in your own country, you had better not cause one in another country.

Smallpox is in a class by itself. The virus that causes smallpox is difficult to acquire — probably only the U.S. and Russia have any in storage — and it is especially difficult to control. Anthrax is more like a chemical agent, because it is not contagious and is treatable with antibiotics.

There is an arms control agreement, the Biological Weapons Convention, that bans the possession and use of biological weapons. About three-fourths of the countries in the world belong to it. This agreement has no verification provisions. Six nations that are members of the Biological Weapons Convention are suspected of having biological weapons stockpiles — China, India, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Russia. Israel has refused to join the Biological Weapons Convention and may have a biological weapons stockpile.

Nuclear weapons are the worst of all. They have a wide range of explosive power. The smallest nuclear weapons are equivalent to about a thousand tons of TNT, and the largest to about 50,000,000 tons of TNT. They are the most difficult to

produce or acquire, despite the fact that the technology has been around since 1945. It is still difficult to produce highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium. Any industrialized state could produce nuclear weapons if it chose to do so, and certainly any country with a nuclear power program could do so. They might not be able to do it quickly, but they certainly could do it.

Terrorists, or terrorist organizations, would need assistance from a nation, in terms of providing either the materials or the weapons themselves. That is one of the reasons why we are as concerned as we are about what has come to be known as the problem of “loose nukes” in Russia. Russia has well more than 10,000 nuclear warheads. They have enough highly enriched uranium, one of the materials from which you can make nuclear warheads, to produce between 40,000 and 80,000 more nuclear warheads, and enough plutonium to produce another 25,000 to 50,000 nuclear warheads. One such weapon is enough to ruin your whole day, and we’re talking about tens of thousands.

We estimate that there are about 6,000 nuclear engineers in Russia who have enough knowledge of nuclear weapons so that, if they were to go to another country and help that nuclear program, it would accelerate significantly. As I often point out when I make this observation, there are those who recommend that we should simply kill everybody who has a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering. For personal reasons, I’ve been opposed to that policy suggestion.

Here, too, we have a significant arms control agreement, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. It forbids non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons and forbids the nuclear weapons states from assisting others in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At the time the treaty was signed, there were five nuclear weapons states, as defined in the treaty. A nuclear weapons state was defined as a state that had detonated a nuclear device before 1967: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now Russia), France, and China.

This treaty does have verification provisions. It is verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is an agency of the United Nations. There are 191 countries in the world; 187 of them are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only four countries in the world are not — Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. Israel, India, and Pakistan went on to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. Cuba probably just refused to sign out of spite. The nations that compose the “Axis of Evil,” as it has recently come to be known — Iraq, Iran, and North Korea — are parties to the NPT, and yet each is suspected of having, or seeking to acquire, nuclear weapons. North Korea is the only one that is believed to possibly have nuclear weapons at this time, while Iran and Iraq are seeking to acquire them.

In a typical discussion of weapons of mass destruction, we would have spoken only of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. But, in the aftermath of 9/11, we have come to use a term that almost doesn’t make any sense, namely “conventional” weapons of mass destruction. This term now does make sense, when we consider commercial passenger jets loaded with jet fuel crashing into large, tall buildings, and killing thousands of people. The death of approximately 3,000 people, the number of fatalities suffered on September 11, in some ways, would not qualify as mass destruction, but it’s surely bad enough. It corresponds roughly to the number of people we lose on U.S. highways in about a month-and-a-half. The trend in recent years has been for terrorist attacks to kill larger and larger numbers of people. It used to be that terrorists did not seek to kill the largest number of people. They wanted the largest number of people to see that they had killed some people, but they did not want to kill many people. That seems to be changing.

Weapons of mass disruption pose a different kind of threat. Weapons of mass disruption threaten not our lives, but our way

of life. And advanced technological societies are far more vulnerable to disruption than are primitive societies.

There are many examples of vulnerabilities. Consider our transportation networks — air, land, and sea. Our airports, and our aircraft themselves. Our bridges, tunnels, ports, and ships. One could go on.

Also highly vulnerable to disruption is cyberspace, through what is called “cyberterrorism.” This includes our communications networks, such as the phone system, the Internet, and cable TV.

Our financial systems are vulnerable: financial markets, banks, and ATMs. Imagine if not one ATM machine worked. And of course, the postal system, as we have seen. There are many ways to disrupt our society and our way of life, and nothing illustrated this better than the use of anthrax in the mail. A handful of deaths frightened millions of people. It closed the U.S. House of Representatives. And it shifted the balance that we thought was appropriate between security and preservation of our civil liberties.

Clearly, some things have changed in the wake of 9/11. But have our national interests changed? Is it still survival, security, and satisfaction, in that order? I believe the answer to that is yes, and that our focus should remain on survival, and particularly on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of nations and — now, we would certainly add — in the hands of terrorist groups.

And so it is not surprising that in the wake of 9/11, we have a “War on Terrorism.” Terrorists are the principal adversary we have longed for all through the nineties. It has been difficult for Americans to have a foreign policy without an adversary. The Soviets had it right when they said, “We are going to deprive you of an enemy.” They understood that that would make things difficult for us. Now we focus on terrorists and terrorist organizations.

We should focus, in particular, on those that possess, or seek to possess, weapons of mass destruction. That is why it makes sense for us to attempt to eliminate Al Qaeda and to prevent the emergence of a successor.

This is something that cannot be accomplished by the U.S. acting alone. It requires the cooperation of others. International terrorism is *every* nation's problem. We have to be prepared to deal with countries that are harboring terrorists who have weapons of mass destruction and/or are helping terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The military intervention in Afghanistan is directed at both. It is directed at the terrorists, Al Qaeda, and at the government that harbored them, the Taliban of Afghanistan.

If Iraq continues to deny access to U.N. inspectors, the United States and others, in my view, should seek to destroy Iraqi facilities related to weapons of mass destruction. I do not believe that this would require invading and occupying Iraq, nor do I believe that it would require the death or capture of Saddam Hussein. That probably would be the hard way and the expensive way, and a way that would cost many, many lives. But we do need good intelligence on where those facilities are. If we know where they are, we can destroy them from a distance. This is clearly a field in which an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a difficult challenge, but surely it is less difficult than dealing with an increasing number of nations and organizations armed with weapons of mass destruction.

There are key measures to be taken, none of which is especially new, to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. First, we must continue to support and extend arms control agreements that deal with these threats, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Export controls can help to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to additional nations, and to nations that might help terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction. So export controls remain crucially important, and that is why we work as hard as we do to get nations like China and Iran to adopt meaningful policies, and why we must continue to do so. If it is only U.S. exports that are controlled, the problem will not be solved.

We must continue to work to prevent the leakage from Russia of weapons, materials, and experts. To the best of my knowledge, that effort has been quite successful thus far. I know of no instance where a quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium sufficient to make a weapon has been lost from Russia.

We should de-emphasize weapons of mass destruction in our rhetoric and in our military planning. It is often important to put yourself in the other fellows' shoes, especially when you may believe that the other fellows are evil, in order to think about why they might want to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Consider the "Axis of Evil."

First, Iraq. Surely the Iraqis remember the Gulf War. Would the Gulf War have been conducted had the United States known that, if we invaded Iraq, there was a good chance that New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles would disappear? Does our current rhetoric about "getting Saddam Hussein" make it more likely or less likely that he will seek to acquire nuclear weapons?

Second, Iran. Surely Iranians remember the Iran-Iraq War, and the fact that Iraq used chemical weapons. They also know of the continuing and understandable U.S. bitterness towards Iran's taking of American hostages. If you were Iranian, would you feel a need for a nuclear arsenal to deter aggression?

Third, North Korea. It was just last week that President Bush found it necessary during his visit to South Korea to assure the

South Koreans that the United States did not intend to invade North Korea. If you were North Korean, would you simply take him at his word, or would you worry about what the U.S. might do?

If you were Indian and shared a long border with a nuclear-armed China, would you feel a need for nuclear weapons? If you were Pakistani, and aware of previous wars with India, as well as an on-going dispute over Kashmir, wouldn't India's nuclear status encourage you to have nuclear weapons of your own?

Seeking to acquire nuclear weapons is not necessarily evil, although in some cases evil people seek to acquire them. We deplore other countries' acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, but it is worth noting that the United States has about 6,000 deployed nuclear warheads. Lately, we have been talking about "serious" reductions, which we consider to be going down to about 2,000 warheads over a period of ten years. And we also insist upon the right to test our nuclear weapons to make sure that they work just right. The United States Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that would have prohibited all such testing.

And all of this despite our having the overwhelmingly dominant military force in the world. The current U.S. defense budget, \$331 billion — that does not include all of the intelligence budget — is greater than the defense budget of the next eight military powers combined. The proposed budget for next year calls for an increase of \$48 billion, which is comparable to the defense budget of Russia. The "Axis of Evil" — Iran, Iraq, and North Korea — together spend about \$15 billion annually, less than a twentieth of what we spend now.

It is hard to argue that others should have zero nuclear weapons, but that the United States needs thousands of them. To be credible, the United States must reduce its own nuclear arsenal. Russia is clearly prepared to do the same, and this is something that must be done.

Another important step we must take is to enhance "homeland defense," although this will be a very hard job. Those of us who have worked with government or in government can appreciate the difficulty of getting the organizational mess straightened out. The Office of Homeland Security has very little authority. The director, Governor Tom Ridge, must be given some control over people and resources that are now in other agencies. These include, for example: the Department of Defense, which has control over our military forces; the Department of Transportation, which is responsible for air travel and the Coast Guard; the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which deals with natural and man-made catastrophes; the Justice Department, which includes the FBI; the Department of Energy, which controls the National Nuclear Weapons Laboratories, and the teams that search for any nuclear weapons that might be constructed in, or smuggled into, the United States; and the Department of Health and Human Services, which is responsible for all public health. These are just some examples of areas over which Tom Ridge has no control — I could go on. Something must be done organizationally.

We must also address the security of our borders. For example, the cargo containers that come into our country every day — by ship, by rail, and by truck — are large enough to hold many nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon could fit in the trunk of your Toyota. You don't need a cargo container. Approximately 2% of cargo containers are inspected when they enter the United States. And what about all of the trucks, trawlers, and people that enter our country? The prospects for sealing our borders are not encouraging. If we ask ourselves, "Should I be optimistic or pessimistic?," we can look to the "War on Drugs" and its lack of success in keeping drugs out of the country. And so we had best also improve our preparations for dealing with catastrophic

events. To do so, we must clarify the federal, the state, and the local roles and bolster the public health infrastructure.

Despite the claims of some, National Missile Defense is *not* a solution to the problem of weapons of mass destruction. In the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) agreed to limit the development, testing, and deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. That's when I first got involved in this field. Before that, I was a happy professor of nuclear engineering. I went to Washington to spend a year doing something else, and I wound up on the team negotiating the ABM Treaty. I recognize my vested interest in the Treaty, but I try to be objective about missile defense issues.

The Bush administration maintains that defenses are now needed to protect the U.S. homeland against missiles being developed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq — the “Axis of Evil” arises again. On December 13, the President gave six months notice of the United States’ intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It is not clear what defenses we would deploy once we could do so, but the current plans call for the U.S. to deploy 100 interceptor missiles in Alaska. These interceptor missiles would be fired into the air when we learned that a long-range missile was headed towards us, with the hope that our missile would intercept the incoming missile. The interceptor missiles would be guided by radars that would be deployed in Alaska, Massachusetts, Greenland, England, and California. What would this system cost? Nobody knows, because the system hasn't been designed yet. But no one estimates less than \$50 billion. Some estimates are more on the order of \$100 billion. But the crucial questions are not about cost. They are: Would this defense work, and would it enhance our security?

Would National Missile Defense work? Let us assume for the moment that National Missile Defense worked exactly as currently intended; that is, that it worked exactly as those who are designing the one hundred interceptor missile system hope it will. Such a system would be completely ineffective against missiles carrying chemical weapons or biological weapons, because the agents would be dispersed into small bomblets long before the offensive missile comes within range of the defensive missile.

National Missile Defense would be completely ineffective, of course, against aircraft, cruise missiles, trucks, trawlers, or other means of delivery of the kinds more likely to be used by terrorists. The hard way to deliver one nuclear weapon to the United States is to put it on a long-range missile. This requires you to miniaturize the nuclear weapon and to develop or acquire an accurate missile. It is much easier to bring the weapon in on a trawler, or a bus, or a truck, or to assemble it in the United States, or, as I used to say, to smuggle it in inside a bale of marijuana.

National Missile Defense would also be ineffective against Russia, because the Russians have enough missiles and warheads to simply overwhelm a defense of one hundred defensive missiles. They have thousands of nuclear warheads.

I want to emphasize that informed proponents of missile defense don't claim that it would do any of the things I have mentioned. What it could do, if it worked exactly as hoped, would be to defend us against a small number of nuclear-armed missiles launched from North Korea. But, as I say, that would be the hard way for the North Koreans to attack an American city or two. And, equally important, a long-range missile leaves a return address. If a long-range missile were to be launched from North Korea, our space satellites would detect exactly where it came from. And after that happened, there wouldn't be a North Korea

any more. National Missile Defense might be effective against China's force of about twenty nuclear-armed intercontinental missiles, but no one doubts that the Chinese could expand their missile force faster than we could deploy our defenses.

This leads me to the question: Would National Missile Defense enhance our security? It might help against accidental, unauthorized, or intentional launches of a small number of missiles from Russia, or China, or North Korea. However, our deployment of such a defense would make it less likely that the Russians would be willing to reduce their nuclear arsenal. It would also increase the chances that the Chinese would expand their nuclear missile arsenal. And it is likely to be irrelevant against the "Axis of Evil" and terrorist groups, because they could deliver weapons of mass destruction by means other than long-range missiles.

In my view, deployment of a National Missile Defense would not be a good use of national security resources. I don't think it would add greatly to the dangers we face, but I do think it would be terribly wasteful.

Let me reiterate my belief that weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests. They threaten, literally, our lives and our way of life. I would like to see the "War on Terrorism" thought of also as the "War on Weapons of Mass Destruction," because that is the fundamental threat to our nation's survival.

The Russian and Chinese arsenals pose the gravest threats, simply because they are the largest. The Russian arsenal is sufficiently large to eliminate the United States as a viable nation. And China could reduce our major cities to rubble. We must maintain constructive relationships with these two nations. And we must ensure that there remains, as there is now, extraordinarily little likelihood of their use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or our allies.

Rogue states, including the "Axis of Evil," and terrorists, pose smaller, but more likely threats. The United States should strive to dissuade, and, if necessary, to prevent their access to weapons of mass destruction, and we must always recognize that this requires collaboration with other nations. U.S. national security policy must adapt to this new world in which a large number of nations and groups can influence the course of world events. This is very different from the Cold War world in which virtually all of our national leaders developed their views. So the U.S. will have to rely heavily on scholars, students, and informed citizens to help shape the national security policy of the future.

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, I set forth three essential goals for the UCLA community. First, to ensure the safety of everyone on this campus. Second, to have UCLA serve as a beacon of tolerance; that is, a place in which each and every person is treated with respect. And third, that UCLA should serve as a forum for rational discourse about the events of September 11th and their global implications. Upon reflection, these goals strike me as appropriate not only for UCLA, but for our country as well. Americans, as well as others in the world, would be well-served if the United States strives: to protect the lives and way of life of our people; to serve as a beacon of tolerance for the world; and to encourage rational discourse among our citizens, and with people everywhere, on how best to make this world a better place for all of us.

On January 6, 1941, eleven months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered an historic State of the Union address. It is best remembered as the "Four Freedoms" speech. I would like to quote a brief portion of it:

*"We look forward to a world founded on four essential freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression — everywhere in the world. The second is freedom for every person to worship God in his*

[and now we would add, or her] *own way — everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want...everywhere in the world. And the fourth is freedom from fear...anywhere in the world.*"

President Roosevelt had it right. He had it right in 1941; he has it right in 2002; he will have it right forever.

